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The purpose of this thesis is to trace the political development of 
the American zone of occupation in Germany following World War II, 
assessing its impact on the eventual division of Germany, as well as on 
the Soviet-American conflict which dominated the post-war world.
This study will focus on the period dating from 1944, when Allied 
victory over Nazi Germany seemed imminent and Germany s future was being 
discussed at the highest levels of government, to early 1947, when the 
American and British zones of occupation merged on an economic basis 
(becoming known as Bizonia), which would pave the way for the formal 
division of Germany in 1949.
The re-establishment of a viable political structure in the 
American zone was based on democratic principles, the foremost being the 
desire to return government to the German people. This effort had been 
undertaken to promote the unification of Germany, but in fact it 
facilitated the nation's division. A plan for unification could never 
be agreed on by the four powers, even as the politicization of the 
American zone continued in earnest. When necessity dictated that the 
American and British zones unite along economic lines, American 
officials sought to prevent the simultaneous growth of a bizonai 
government, fearing that such a creation would be tantamount to 
permanently dividing the country. The American emphasis on German 
self-government —  evidenced by a resurgence of political parties, the 
holding of elections, and the drafting of constitutions -- created a 
certain political momentum which was not easily stifled. A German role 
in governing Bizonia was eventually accepted, and the country was 
formally divided two years iater.
With regard to the origins of the Cold War, this thesis will show 
that the occupation authorities perceived the primary stumbling block to 
unification to be France, rather than the Soviet Union. The French 
consistently refused to consider measures that might have led to 
unification, until certain territorial questions were agreed upon. The 
failure of the French to acquiesce, as much as anything else, forced the 
United States to seek a bizonal arrangement with Great Britain in July 
1946. A second point, arising from the first, is that the American 
officials in Germany regarded the Russian delegation with considerably 
less skepticism than officials at home. Therefore, while the United 
States and the Soviet Union engaged in hostile declarations toward one 
another throughout the early post-war period, relations between the two 
countries delegations in Germany remained relatively cordial. It was 
France who received the brunt of American hostility in Germany. 
Negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union regarding 
Germany finally broke down in March 1948, but by then the Cold War was 
in ful1 swing.
Introduction
Eyebrows were raised when President Franklin Roosevelt met with 
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland 
in August 1941 to discuss post-war goals. The United States was still 
four months away from entering the war, and many wondered what business 
Roosevelt had proclaiming what amounted to war aims. The declaration 
which resulted from the talks, commonly known as the Atlantic Charter, 
contributed to the notion that by August 1941 the United States was a 
non-belligerent in name only. More importantly, the conference 
indicated that American leaders had a clear conception of what they 
wanted in the post-war world, and the confidence that they possessed the 
means to realize these goals. The United States was finally emerging 
from the depression that had gripped the country, and the world, 
throughout the 1930's and policymakers were determined to create an 
international order that would eliminate those conditions which had 
brought depression and war.
This post-war vision had both political and economic elements. 
American leadership hoped to create an economic order best understood 
under the rubric of multilateralism —  a system guaranteeing all nations 
open access to raw materials and world markets. Furthermore, it was 
assumed that multilateralism could only flourish in a world composed of 
democratic nations, the political corollary to an economic objective.
Economic freedom and political democracy may have shared top billing 
at the Atlantic Conference, but even a cursory look at the wartime 
planning of the United States indicates the degree to which economic 
considerations dominated policy formulation. The heated negotiations 
with the imperial-minded British over the terms of Lend-Lease, as well
as the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, come readily to mind as 
examples of American determination to solidify their multilateral 
position before the end of the war. This uneven planning suggests that 
the United States was not entirely prepared for the tremendous job that 
faced her in the post-war period, namely the occupation of the defeated 
Axis nations. Of course, even the wartime preparations for a 
multilateral world could not have anticipated the tremendous destruction 
in Europe and the Pacific, a vivid reminder of the distance between 
American goals and the effort which would be necessary to realize them,
* * *
Lying at the heart of Europe —  literally and figuratively —  was 
defeated Nazi Germany, and whatever the United States considered its 
priorities to be, every area of German society needed rebuilding, not 
the least of which was a viable political structure. Compared with the 
fall of the Imperial regime in 1918, and the Weimar failure fifteen 
years later, the collapse of the Third Reich in May 1945 was easily the 
most severe, given that the entire German governing apparatus had been 
tainted by Nazism, leaving no foundation on which to construct future 
government. The job of establishing a political structure, then, would 
be one of the primary tasks of the occupation. Making this job more 
difficult would be the presence of four occupying powers (United States, 
Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France) each with its own conception of 
what it wanted in a post-war Germany.
Within this context, this thesis will attempt to do three things. 
First, it will trace some of the early political developments in the
American zone of Germany. Second, it will highlight the relationship 
between the political aspects of the occupation and certain significant 
economic developments. Much has been written on the economic policies 
of the United States during the occupation period, most notably the 
problems with the Soviet Union on the matter of reparations. The 
emphasis here will be on political issues, but it will become apparent 
that when the United States was forced to make a major policy decision, 
it was usually done with its economic interests in mind. This is not to 
suggest that the political developments were unimportant. On the 
contrary, the West German government which emerged in 1949 was as much a 
result of the advanced degree of political activity in the American 
zone, as it was a response to economic needs.
Finally, and with an eye toward the continuing debate on the 
origins of the Cold War, this thesis will seek to show that American 
political policy in the early occupation period was directed not toward 
the division of Germany, but rather its unification. The fundamental 
economic and political differences between the United States and Soviet 
Union should have made the eventual split less surprising, but in 1945 
American officials felt that agreement was both desirable and possible.
Indeed, it appears that it was France, not the Soviet Union, which was
perceived to be the stumbling block to four-power unity in Germany. 
However, growing tension outside Germany —  centered on Washington and 
Moscow —  came to overshadow whatever degree of cordiality existed among 
the four powers during the early stages of the occupation. By focusing 
primarily on the political development of Germany, and its relationship
to four-power unity, it is hoped that this thesis will provide some
3
understanding of the occupation's democratization program, and its role 
in the eventual division of Germany.
4
1. Wartime Planning
The earliest attempt to establish a modus vivendi for control in 
Germany began at the 1943 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, at 
which time the representatives of the Big Three —  the United States, 
Soviet Union, and Great Britain —  agreed to the formation of a European 
Advisory Commission <EAC>. The primary function of the commission, 
headquartered in London, was to prepare a joint allied approach to the 
immediate post-surrender treatment of Germany. The work of the EAC 
produced two agreements in late 1944. The first, on September 12, 
called for the division of Germany, as well as its capital city of 
Berlin, into three zones of occupation. The second, on November 14, 
established the machinery of the occupation —  an Allied Control Council 
(ACC) to jointly administer Germany, and a Kommendatura to jointly 
administer Berlin.1 The occupation zones and Control Council were 
designed as interim measures, to be used until the occupying powers were 
prepared to reunite Germany. Unknown at the time, however, was that 
these agreements would go a long way to ensure the very division it 
sought to prevent.
Important as these accomplishments were, the EAC was equally 
significant for what it did not accomplish. . As mentioned, the initial 
agreement established zones of occupation in Berlin, itself in the 
Soviet zone. At the time it was assumed by Great Britain and the United
^reat Britain, Foreign Office, Selected Documents or Germany and 
the Question of Berlin. 1944-1961. 1961, pp. 27-33.
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States that implicit in the agreement was the right of unrestricted 
access to their respective zones. This assumption is significant for 
two reasons. First, it was maintained in the face of criticism. George 
Kennan, appointed as political advisor to John Winant, the American 
representative to the EAC, argued against Winant's implicit reading of 
the agreement. He argued to no avail, and left the position soon 
after.2 A second critic was Robert Murphy, newly appointed as political 
advisor to General Eisenhower in Germany, and who had been sent to 
London beforehand to observe the proceedings of the commission. The 
lack of an agreement disturbed him, and years later he would feel 
partially responsible for not having pressed the point.^
The second, and more striking point, is that Winant's reluctance to 
force the access issue was apparently politically motivated. In London, 
Murphy confronted Winant on the issue and was told, as Kennan had been 
before him, that the right to free access was implicit in the United 
States' right to be in Berlin. According to Murphy, Winant added that 
"the Russians . . . were inclined to suspect our motives anyway, and if 
we insisted on this technicality, we would intensify their distrust."4 
According to Winant's biographer, Bernard Bel lush, the creation of the 
EAC had pleased Winant for the simple reason that it ensured the Soviet
2George Kennan, Memoirs. 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1967), pp. 170-1.
^Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1964), p.233.
4Ibid., p. 232.
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Union would be actively involved in the post-war planning.^ In 1948 the 
right of direct access to Berlin would take on such importance that the 
failure to secure it in 1944 would assume the status of a monumental 
blunder. However, in 1944 direct access to Berlin rated second in 
priority to maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union.
Kennan has pointed out that President Roosevelt had no love for the 
European Advisory Commission. In fact, the commission had to narrow 
considerably the scope of its activity to obtain the President's 
approval, and only with additional urging from Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull was it given.^ Hull felt that some sort of post-war 
planning for Germany must get underway. Roosevelt, as has often been 
noted, was extremely reluctant to make decisions concerning the post-war 
world, as it could possibly tie his hands at a later date. For him the 
EAC represented such a threat. Kennan has suggested that one way the 
President controlled the situation was to appoint Winant who, as well as 
being the U.S. representative to the EAC, was the Ambassador to Great 
Britain, effectively reducing his ability to participate as actively as 
would a full-time delegate.^ Bel lush has further suggested that 
"Winant's role was severely circumscribed by serious divisions in 
Washington over German policy and the tensions created by departmental
^Bernard Bel lush, He Walked Alone (The Hague: Mouton and Company, 





rivalries."0 The combination of a non-committal President and 
departmental strife resulted in Winant's inability to ever know exactly 
what was expected of him, leaving him, according to Bel lush, "shaken and 
embarassed."9
Winant's frustration suggests that his position was less functional
than political. Simply put, he shared the President's views on the need
for Soviet-American cooperation. That this was extremely important to
Roosevelt is i1 lustrated by Robert Murphy, who wrote of a 1944 meeting
with the President:
He urged me to bear in mind that our primary 
post-war objective was Soviet-American 
cooperation —  without which world peace would 
be impossible —  and that Germany would be 
the proving ground for such cooperation.^
When Winant discounted suggestions by both Kennan and Murphy to reach an
explicit agreement over direct access to Berlin, it was simply because
American policy, for Roosevelt and Winant, demanded that German
questions be subsumed under a general policy of Soviet-American
cooperation. Characteristically, Kennan responded to the activities of
the EAC by regarding as "unreal the hopes for collaboration with the
Russians in the governing of Germany."^ Kennan was prophetic in this
regard, and while he would eventually be vindicated, the mood in 1944






This optimism, however, was not grounded in any viable United 
States policy toward Germany, or even a consensus on what to do with the 
defeated Reich. The failure of the United States to formulate a 
coherent policy for Germany has long been a focus of criticism for 
historians, typified by Manfred Jonas' comment that "neither the fact 
that eventual victory was virtually certain by early 1943 nor the 
primacy of Germany in American eyes resulted in the development of a 
specific policy for Germany's future."*2 Jonas, like many, has placed 
the blame for this state of affairs on Roosevelt, whose disdain for 
wartime commitment is well known. Even had Roosevelt sought policy 
clarification, the process would have been clouded by conflicting 
opinions from administration officials, Congress, and the public alike. 
Roosevelt's own instincts were decidedly anti-Nazi, if not anti-German, 
and even as delay defined his policy, his mind would prove fertile soil 
for the proponents of a harsh peace, namely Treasury Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau.
The volume of sources alone indicates that the question of what to 
do with Germany after the war was much-discussed among Americans during 
the war. Generally speaking, the debate centered on whether the Allies 
should inflict on Nazi Germany a harsh peace, or employ a milder 
approach, geared toward the eventual reconstruction of the country.
This debate was taken up in an October 1944 Newsweek article by American 
journalist Dorothy Thompson and British diplomat Lord Vansittart,
12Manfred Jonas, The United States and Germany (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1984), p. 264.
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whose name, like Morgenthau's, became synonomous with a harsh peace. 
While Vansittart argued that the German people must be treated "without 
sentiment or softness," Thompson took a more conciliatory approach, 
insisting that "punishment and reconstruction must be divorced. They 
are not the same thing."13
A Fortune magazine survey in March 1945 indicates that the American 
public was not necessarily in agreement with Thompson's approach. Of 
those polled, 31% believed Germany would never again be a "good" nation, 
and another 37% felt it would take Germany at least twenty years to 
reach that standard. Only half of the respondents felt that Germany 
should even be allowed to remain an industrial nation. The magazine 
also made a comparison based on a similar survey given in January 1944, 
and the responses indicated growing frustration and hostility toward the 
German enemy. On the issue of partitioning Germany, 41% (up from 29%), 
favored breaking the country into smaller units, and 62% (up from 46%) 
favored using German labor to rebuild countries whom Germany had 
devastated. "In short," the magazine concluded, "the majority of 
American people . . . believe the United Nations must rebuild the German 
society from the ground up."14
Congress, too, reflected the divergent opinion over the treatment 
of Germany. Rep. Karl M. LeCompte of Iowa entered into the Record a 
newspaper article from his predecessor, Rep. Lloyd Thurston, in which he
13.1 Vansittart, Dorothy Thompson Argue the Hard Peace Question," 
Newsweek. October 9, 1944, pp. 104, 111.
14.1 The Fortune Survey," Fortune. March 1945, pp. 254-262.
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proposed that Germany be prohibited from rebuilding her cities for 
twenty years as a reminder of her wrongdoing. Idaho Rep. Compton I. 
White, also in an extension of remarks, cited former Ambassador to 
Germany, James W. Gerard, who claimed that the "German people are a 
hopeless problem for the world," and called for the dismemberment of the 
country. A more outrageous suggestion came from Rep. J. Buell Snyder of 
Pennsylvania who suggested that the occupation authorities "must have a 
key to every door in Germany for the next 60 years to be sure that all 
individuals or groups are carrying out the fundamentals in the [Allied] 
peace and security p r o g r a m . " ^
These harsh suggestions were answered by more conciliatory remarks 
from other Congressmen. Rep. Usher L. Burdick of North Dakota summed up 
the feelings of this group when he stated that "the philosophy of 
crushing Germany as a nation should be abandoned if we are actually 
looking for a durable peace." This sentiment was echoed by Sen. Glen H. 
Taylor of Idaho who added, in the finest multilateral fashion, that the 
"German economy is closely interlocked with the economy of all European 
countries and to a lesser extent with world economy. Decisions with 
respect to German production will have repercussions in many other 
l a n d s . T h e  realization of Germany's central role in the economy of
S. Congress, House, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1 December 1943, 
Congressional Record 80:A5234; 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 12 June 1944, 
81:A3084; 79th Cong., 1st sess., 26 March 1945, 82:2779.
i6U. S. Congress, House, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 19 September 1944, 
Congressional Record 81:A4151; Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 12 
February 1945, 82:A582.
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Europe would eventually take root in American policy, but the mood was 
such in early 1945, that Sen. Taylor's comment may have been deemed as 
equally outrageous, maybe moreso, as that of Rep. Snyder's 60-year plan.
Taking the middle road was Rep. Albert Gore of Tennessee who, 
following his return from a fact-finding mission, gave a lengthy speech 
in March 1945 on conditions in Germany. Sounding like a hardliner, Gore 
bluntly stated that "justice cannot be done without punishment." He 
qualified this, however, with his conviction "that only a just peace 
based on Christian principles can endure."1^  It is interesting to note, 
that Gore's views seemed to have been affected by his first-hand look at 
those parts of Germany already under occupation. Later, after the 
occupation had begun, the difference of opinion between those in 
Germany, faced with the reality of the destruction, and those in 
Washington, as to what course of action to follow, would be significant.
While Congress wrangled over the post-war issues, the men closest 
to the President were no closer to agreement either. The main 
protagonists were Morgenthau, Hull, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson. 
The problem between Hull and Stimson, according to Walter Dorn, was 
differing conceptions of the "nature, scope, and duration of the 
contemplated military government for Germany for which the War 
Department felt itself to be in the first instance responsible."1®
170. S. Congress, House, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 19 March 1945, 
Congressional Record 82:2454-5.
^Walter Dorn, "The Debate Over American Occupation Policy in 
Germany in 1944-1945." Political Science Quarterly 72 (December 1957): 
487.
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They did, however, basically agree on a broad plan of reconstruction for 
Germany. It was Morgenthau whose views were both controversial and 
extreme. Not surprisingly, on the eve of the September 1944 Quebec 
Conference between Roosevelt and Churchill, the United States had yet to 
establish a policy. In a letter to the President, Hull wrote that this 
was a problem of "great importance and considerable urgency," which 
needed to be discussed before proceeding with any discussion with Great 
Britain or the Soviet Union.
The program that the President ultimately accepted as the basis for 
discussion at Quebec, no doubt to Hull's dismay, was the one proposed by 
Morgenthau. The fundamental premise of what came to be known as the 
Morgenthau Plan was that "ending the menace of German aggression 
consists, in its simplest terms, of depriving Germany of all heavy 
industries.^ Morgenthau conceived of an agricultural and pastoral 
Germany dominated by the farmer. The specifics of the plan may not have 
attracted Roosevelt as much as Morgenthau's belief, like Winant's, in 
the inviolability of the Soviet-American relationship. Morgenthau was 
extremely critical of those he felt were advocating the reconstruction 
of Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and communism, arguing 
that "the nomination of Germany as the watchdog to guard us against 
peril attains fantastic heights of madness.Roosevelt's acceptance
^Letter from Hull to Roosevelt, 28 August 1944, FRUS: Quebec.
19M.
^Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany is Our Prob1em (New York: Harper 
and Bros., 1945), p. 16.
2*Ibid., p. 99.
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of this plan appears inexplicable unless one considers his determination 
to extend Soviet-American wartime cooperation into peacetime.
The initial appeal of the Morgenthau Plan, however, could not 
overcome its fundamental shortcomings. Was it possible, after all, for 
Roosevelt, promulgator of the Atlantic Charter, to embrace a program 
that assumed a viable German economy was unnecessary for a strong 
Europe? Furthermore, could the President support a plan, whose author 
disavowed the need to introduce democracy to the Germans, on the grounds 
that "the present generation [of Germans] have become the most fanatical 
haters of democracy ever known in the world," and that an established 
democratic government would meet with the same fate as had the 
government of the Weimar Republic?^ The Presidents ill-advised 
support for the Morgenthau Plan should not be interpreted as a move away 
from the lofty goals of the Atlantic Charter. For all of Morgenthau's 
cynical observations on the prospects for democracy in Germany, the 
question in late 1944 was not whether a democratic form of government 
should be established, but how it would be accomplished.
* # #
Despite the administration's unofficial policy of postponing 
difficult decisions, some degree of planning did take place during the 
war, albeit at a lower, departmental level. A State Department memo 
prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS/623) in December 1943 stated
^Ibid., pp. 131, 140.
14
that the "most desirable form of government for Germany would be a 
broadly based democracy operating under a bill of rights to safeguard 
the civil and political liberties of the individual." The memo further 
suggested that the "threat of Germany to general security might be 
lessened through decentralization of the German political s t r u c t u r e . " ^  
What was not known at the time was whether Germany would be partitioned 
following her defeat. Roosevelt favored partition, but the State 
Department was adamant in its opposition, citing that "because of the 
high degree of economic, political, and cultural integration in Germany, 
it must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be imposed 
but also maintained by force.“24
The State Department issued a more comprehensive statement of its 
post-war political goals in May 1944. The memo, prepared by the 
Advisory Committee on Postwar Problems, had three primary proposals:
1) The United States should encourage democratic 
se1f-government;
2) The allies should promote a federal government 
structure, involving the division of Prussia 
into several smaller states;
3) Political reconstruction should start on the 
local level and extend to larger units as 
success becomes apparent.
Broadly speaking, this was the program that would be implemented in
occupied Germany, yet since it came from a lower level committee, it
2^"U.S. Proposal for the Treatment of Germany," JCS/623, 18 
December 1943, National Archives, Box 602.
24Memo by Committee on Postwar Problems, 5 August 1944, FRUS:
Quebec. 1944. p. 59.
^Memo by Committee on Postwar Problems, 31 May 1944, FRUS: Quebec. 
1944. pp. 50, 53.
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never had the force of policy. In fact, what is most striking about the 
State Department correspondence of this period is the considerable 
skepticism expressed in regard to the prospects for Soviet-American 
cooperation.
A briefing paper prepared at the time of the Quebec Conference 
stated that "nothing should be done along political lines [at the 
Conference] which might jeopardize Soviet military cooperation against 
Germany," but cautioned that the United States did not "intend to 
acquiesce in Soviet policies which we consider internationally 
destructive merely for the sake of avoiding unpleasant issues."^ 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman voiced his concern in a 
letter to presidential advisor Harry Hopkins, writing that "the job of 
getting the Soviet government to play a decent role in international 
affairs is . . . going to be more difficult than we had hoped."27 
However, in 1944 Franklin Roosevelt held sway over American foreign 
policy and cooperation would be the primary objective.
Death would deny Roosevelt the opportunity to carry out his vision 
for post-war cooperation. The Yalta Conference in February 1945 proved 
to be his last chance to enlist the goodwill of the Soviet Union in 
tackling the problems of post-war Germany. Yet, little was achieved in 
this regard. The primary accomplishment was the affirmation of the EAC 
agreements establishing zones of occupation and control machinery for
^Department of State Briefing Paper, undated, FRUS: Quebec. 1944. 
p . 193.
27Letter from Harriman to Hopkins, 9 September 1944, FRUS: Quebec. 
1944. p. 199.
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Germany. A second agreement was Stalin's acceptance of France as a 
fourth member of the Control Council, and the granting to her of an 
occupation zone, to be carved from the American and British z o n e s . In 
contrast to his efforts toward Soviet-American cooperation, the 
President had left little in the way of policy to govern the occupation 
and, according to Jonas, even that was stated "in broad and frequently 
contradictory terms, and those charged with its implementation were left 
largely to find their own way between rhetoric and r e a l i t y . "29
28£BU3: Malta and Yalta. 1245. PP. 970-1. 
Jonas, p. 264.
2. Democracy in Germany
Not until the surrender of Germany did a comprehensive, if somewhat 
controversial, strategy for the U.S. occupation emerge. On May 14, 1945 
a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive was issued to the Military Governor in 
Germany, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. This directive, known as 
JCS/1067, was a compromise between the occupation programs of the State 
and War Departments and what Murphy called the "incongruous additions 
inspired by the Morgenthau Plan."* General Lucius D. Clay,2 the Deputy 
Military Governor, wrote that there was no doubt that JCS/1067 
"contemplated the Carthaginian peace which dominated our operations in 
Germany during the early months of occupation."^ According to John 
Gimbel, Clay was "shocked not by its [JCS/10673 punitive provisions, but 
by its failure to foresee the economic and financial conditions that 
prevailed."** The primary objections to the directive, in fact, were the 
extremely restrictive economic provisions.
The directive also contained very little of a constructive nature 
regarding the political future of Germany. In a brief statement, it did
*Murphy, p. 250.
2Clay, though Deputy Military Governor, was de facto in charge of 
governing the American zone in Germany. Eisenhower was primarily 
concerned with military matters, such as the transfer of troops to the 
Pacific theater, and dealt little with occupation affairs. Clay became 
Military Governor in 1947, a position he held until May 1949.
3Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1950), p. 19.
^John Gimbel, The American Qccupation of Germany (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 1.
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urge the decentralization of the political structure and the 
development of local governmental responsibility. More forcefully 
expressed, however, was the restriction that "no political activities of 
any kind shall be countenanced unless authorized by [the Military 
Governor]." Oddly enough, the Military Governor was further requested 
to ensure "that your military government does not become committed to 
any political g r o u p . T h e  drafters of JCS/1067 seemed to have conceded 
that some political activity was inevitable, but were extremely 
reluctant to encourage it at that point. Resolution of this tension, 
however, was not long in coming.
By the time JCS/1067 was released to the public in October, the 
Potsdam Conference had convened and many of the harsh measures had been 
modified. JCS/1067 technically would remain in effect until July 1947 
—  when it was replaced by JCS/1779 —  but it was effectively superceded 
at Potsdam. Potsdam also saw the eclipse of the influence of Henry 
Morgenthau. The controversial Treasury Secretary resigned on July 5, 
apparently in response to his not being invited to the conference.^
The man responsible for provoking Morgenthau^ resignation was 
Roosevelts successor, Harry S. Truman who, as a Senator, had opposed 
the Morgenthau Plan. Truman, however, in the first months of his 
administration did not seek to upset the status quo with respect to 
Germany. With no foreign policy experience in his background, he was
Directive to Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation 
Regarding the Military Government of Germany," JCS/1067/6, 26 April 
1945, National Archives, Box 597.
^Murphy, p. 270.
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content to continue Roosevelt's policies, though he was more skeptical 
of the Soviets than his predecessor.7 Harold Zink has written that 
Truman's lack of experience manifested itself in a reluctance to become 
involved in those situations most pressing, the result being that "for 
about a year following the German capitulation it was virtually 
impossible to get the White House to give attention to policy matters 
relating to Germany."® The effect of this was that the American zonal 
authorities acted almost unilaterally, not only in respect to the other 
occupying powers, but in respect to their own government as well. Jean 
Edward Smith has argued that American policy was formulated in an 
"exceedingly ad hoc manner," a state of affairs which prompted Murphy to 
write that Clay "was destined to become the most Influential American in 
Europe during several crucial post-war years.
At a political level, Clay saw the problem confronting Germany as 
being that of a political vacuum created by the defeat of the Nazis, a 
vacuum which "had to be filled promptly with democratic leadership."*® 
The results of the Potsdam Conference were to provide some guidance in
'Truman's remark after Germany's 1941 invasion of Russia: "If we 
see that Germany is winning we should help Russia and if Russia is 
winning we ought to help Germany and that way let them kill as many as 
possible . . . .", New York Times. 24 June 1941.
®Harold Zink, The Uni ted States in Germany. 1944-1955 (New York: D. 
Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1957), p. 89.
^Jean Edward Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clav. Vol.




this effort. Potsdam's declaration of ’political principles, like 
JCS/1067, emphasized decentralization and the promotion of local 
governmental responsiblity, but it backed off from the directive's 
restrictions, and called for the encouragement of political activity on 
the local level.11 As might be expected from a document reflecting the 
input of the three powers, the political principles were fairly vague. 
This not only ensured agreement at a tripartite level, but also granted 
Clay considerable maneuverability in his actions.
The Potsdam declaration, however, contained a provision which, 
unintentionally, would facilitate the move toward the division of 
Germany. Each of the political provisions, except one, granted rights 
to the occupying powers in their respective zones. The exception was a 
stipulation that called for Allied cooperation in an interzonal effort. 
Recognizing that certain functions would be better and more efficiently 
performed at the national level —  such as finance, transport, 
communications, foreign trade, and industry —  the three powers agreed 
to set up central agencies for this p u r p o s e . ^  Prior to Potsdam, Clay 
had written Under Secretary of War John McCloy that he was optimistic 
the Allies would agree to these national administrations. The three 
powers did agree at Potsdam, but later events would betray Clay's early 
optimism, and strike a damaging blow to hopes for German unification.
U FRUS: Berlin (Potsdam). 1945. II, pp. 1481-1483.
^Ibid., p. 1483.
^Letter from Clay to McCloy, 16 June 1945, Clav Papers, p. 24.
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The French had been granted a zone of occupation and a place on the 
Allied Control Council at the Yalta Conference. However, the Yalta 
conferees also agreed that France not be invited to participate at the 
Potsdam gathering. The French were determined to frustrate any plans 
that called for centralization of any kind, for fear that this would 
lead to a strengthened Germany.*4 In this respect, they possessed what 
Murphy called a "double veto," not only the right to veto the 
implementation of any proposal before the Control Council, but the right 
to veto the implementation of any proposal previously agreed to at Yalta 
or P o t s d a m . T h e  issue of central agencies would remain tied up in the 
Control Council until its demise im March 1948. In the meantime, 
government in the United States zone took shape.
* * #
Perhaps the best contemporary elaboration of the issue of German 
government was given in a memorandum prepared by Harold Zink, while he 
was with the Political Division of the Office of Military Government, 
United States COMGUS). The document was prepared in conjunction with 
the Potsdam Conference, though the recommendations were much more 
detailed than anything arising out of the conference, a good example of 
the vacuum of official policy being filled by the military government 
itself. The primary objective of the occupation, according to Zink, was
*4Memo from Jefferson Caffery, Ambassador to France, to Byrnes, 3 
November 1945, FRUS. 1945. Ill, p. 890.
*^ Murphy, p. 286.
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"to prevent a recurrence of such international menaces as German 
militarism and national socialism." He felt that an adequate 
governmental structure would go a long way toward this goal. He 
cautioned that, in establishing this government, the American leadership 
should not proceed on the basis of expediency and inadequate 
knowledge.^
Years later, writing on the American occupation, Zink would 
castigate Henry Morgenthau and his plan for failing to understand "the
1 7deep-seated and indissoluble connections between Germany and Europe."1' 
In 1945 Zink's message was the same: do not ignore Germany's past! He 
advised that it was important to consider the governmental system which 
had evolved over time. Failure to do so would lead to chaos and 
undermine the occupation's primary political objective, "to prepare for 
the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic 
basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by 
Germany."
In Hitler's Third Reich all governing functions had been 
centralized at the Reich level, to the point that the government 
controlled virtually every aspect of human activity. Elaborating on the 
already stated United States policy of decentralization of the political 
structure, Zink recommended that government be re-established along the
^Memo by Harold Zink, FRUS: Potsdam. II, p. 766.
l^Zink, Uni ted States in Germany. p. 2.
18£HUS: Potsdam. II, p. 1482.
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Gemeinde (village), Kreis (county, city), Regierungsbezirk (region),
Land (state) structure, the traditional German federal structure, which 
had been emasculated in Hitlers highly centralized Reich government.
In accordance with the Potsdam provisions, political activity in Germany 
would begin at the local —  Gemeinde and Kreis —  level. Zink felt that 
giving Germans responsibility for the conduct of local affairs would be 
good training in democracy.1^
fly July 1945, administrations at the Gemeinde, Stadtkreis (city), 
and Landkreis (county) level had been established and German officials 
appointed. Regional administrations (Regierungsbezirk) had also been 
established to supervise several counties, as well as to perform 
functions not possible at the local level.20 One obstacle that had been 
overcome in this period was finding competent people, who had also 
resisted Nazism, to participate in the new government. Mandatory 
removal of Nazis from positions of responsibility, as called for by 
JCS/1067 and later Potsdam, had caused some disruption early in the 
occupation period, but Clay felt the results of this action to be 
beneficial
In spite of these handicaps [disruption of essential 
facilities], we believe that our prompt action in 
removal of Nazis has speeded up the application of 
democratic processes in Germany and will result in 
stronger organizations at an earlier date than would 
have been obtained by a more gradual release of Nazis.**1
^Ibid., p. 767, 771.
20Clay, p. 85? FRUS: Potsdam. II, p. 770.
21Letter from Clay to Hilldring, 14 January 1946, Clav Papers, p.
148.
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For Clay, the imposing task of denazification, far from being a 
stumbling block to democratic growth, actually facilitated such growth.
With government operating at the local and regional level, U.S. 
military authorities prepared for the formation of government at the 
state (Land) level. This step was called for by the Potsdam protocol, 
and was consistent with American policy. Clay would later write that, 
"consistently we supported a structure which gave adequate but limited 
powers to a federal government."22 in Germany this would involve 
authority being vested in the Laender (states). In the Third Reich, 
Hitler had managed to strip the Laender of their historical prerogative 
in German affairs and, according to Zink, it was "of first rate 
importance that the Laender be restored to a position of vitality and 
influence.''22 Not surprisingly, the July 1945 Military Governors 
Report indicated that "modified governments have been established at all 
levels up to and including state (Land) governments.1,24
Despite the establishment of a federal administrative structure, 
the United States zone was still operating under a ban on political 
activity, as dictated by JCS/1067. Conversely, the Potsdam protocol 
maintained that "all democratic political parties with rights of 
assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged
22Clay, p. 17.
23M!3: Potsdam. II, p. 770.
Summary of July 1945 Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone, 
Germany," JCS/1517, 19 September 1945, National Archives, Box 598.
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throughout Germany.2® In fact, the Soviets had authorized political 
activity in their zone on June 10, before Potsdam. Not until August 27, 
however, was a revised directive issued for the U.S. zone, "under which 
military government officers may accept and approve applications for 
permission to form democratic political parties to engage in political 
activities at the Kreis level."2® A USFET (U.S. Forces, European 
Theatre) memo of September 19 explained the difficulty in such a 
proposi tion
It is not possible to define the exact line between 
political parties and other groups, but in general an 
association of limited membership seeking to advance 
by a common representation specific interests of its 
members is not to be considered a political party.27
Two groups whose political party status was unquestioned were the
Communists and Social Democrats, who were active informally before the
lifting of the ban, especially in the urban areas. This activity,
however, was not representative of the zone population as a whole. In
fact, Brewster Morris of the Political Division reported on July 16 that
“as regards the present ban on political activity, we were interested to
note that except for the communists . . . practically all other Germans
we spoke to favor the present ban."2®
25£EUS-* Potsdam. II, p. 1482.
2®HSunanary of August 1945 report of the Military Governor, U.S. 
Zone, Germany," JCS/1517/1, 18 October 1945, National Archives, Box 598.
27Memo from USFET to Commanding General, Western Military District, 
19 September 1945, National Archives, Box 598.
2®Memo by Brewster Morris, 16 July 1945, FRUS, 1945. Ill, p. 951.
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Political activity in the U.S. zone picked up somewhat during 
September and October, as the Germans began to respond to their newly 
granted freedom to reorganize political parties. The military 
government reported that 45 local groups, representing ten parties, had 
been authorized at the Kreis level.^ The fragmented nature of the 
political organization did not, however, concern the authorities, who 
generally wished to discourage a combination of parties from forming a 
united political bloc.3  ^ Generally speaking, though, the German 
population was still politically dormant. Clay would write Secretary of 
War Robert Patterson on October 13 that “except for the cities . . . 
complete political apathy is reported from nearly every section of Ethel 
American zone."3* However, problems at the quadripartite level would 
facilitate the next major step in the democratization of Germany.
John Gimbel has written that the actions of France "left little 
doubt that it intended to block the very economic features of the 
Potsdam agreement that Americans in Germany had greeted as welcome 
relief from the previous limitations of JCS/1067.1,32 Among these 
features were the central agencies called for in the political 
provisions of the agreement. The French, however, stubbornly refused to
^"Summary of October 1945 Report of the Military Governor, U.S. 
Zone, Germany," JCS/1517/3, 16 December 1945, National Archives, Box 
598.
3^Party organizations were not authorized at the Land level until
November 30, 1945.
31Memo from Clay to Patterson, 13 October 1945, Clav Papers, p.
101.
32Gimbel, American Occupation of Germany, p. 17.
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accept this or any part of the agreement, unless certain other 
conditions were met, namely the annexation of the Saar and the 
internationalization of the Ruhr, Germany's industrial heartland. The 
French, notably Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, argued that if 
Germany's western frontiers were not delineated before centralized 
administrations were set up, then there would be little chance that 
French views on the Ruhr and Saar would ever prevail. The feeling was 
that once these agencies were set up, it would be virtually impossible 
to detach politically those areas under dispute from Germany.33
Acquiescence to the French demands, however, was not forthcoming.
In a letter to the Secretary of State, Winant suggested that the United 
States' opposition to the French position was based on the fear of 
having "Russians participate in administration of territory so far west, 
so strategically located and so industrially important. m3<*
Policymakers, however, seemed equally concerned that separation would 
create a German irredenta that would stand as a source of agitation for 
years to come.3^ Neither side was willing to concede, and the Control 
Council, on this important issue, lapsed into stalemate. Certain that 
some degree of centralization was necessary to perform basic functions 
—  such as communications and transport —  the American zone leadership 
met with the minister-presidents of the three American Laender (Bavaria,
33Memo from Caffery to Byrnes, 1 March 1946, FRUS, 1946. V, p. 509.
34Letter from Winant to Byrnes, 16 November 1945, FRUS. 1945. Ill, 
p. 894.
35Memo from Patterson to Byrnes, 11 June 1946, FRUS. 1946. II, p.
487.
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Wuerttemberg-Baden, and Greater Hessen) in October to form the Council 
of States, or Laenderrat, an agency to perform these much needed 
functions and coordinate services, in lieu of the more desirable 
German-wide agencies.3®
This decision, however, was not made without misgivings. In a 
September 29 letter to Byrnes, Murphy called attention to Clay's concern 
that "unless central machinery is established promptly, it will have to 
be established in the United States zone alone, thus creating a new 
artificial political unit." In addition, Murphy reported Clay's fear 
that "this may lead to actual dismemberment."37 Clay, wishing to avoid 
the.appearance of creating a separate political unit, stated in his 
introductory remarks at the October 17 Stuttgart meeting of the 
minister-presidents that, "it must be strongly emphasized that a Zone 
authority is not contemplated. On the contrary, what is involved is a 
clearing house and a research agency by which concrete proposals can be 
formulated."3® Clay's concern over possibly provoking Soviet mistrust 
was evident also in his decision not to establish in the American zone a 
capitol city in which to locate the Laenderrat, a move which might lead
3®"Summary of October 1945 Report of Military Governor."
"Landrat," and not "Laenderrat," is the correct translation of "Council 
of States." However, since American policymakers used "Laenderrat" in 
their correspondence and documents, I have maintained its use here.
37Memo from Murphy to Byrnes, 29 September 1945, FRUS. 1945. Ill, 
p. 879.
^Introductory remarks by General Clay at meeting of Land Minister 
Presidents, 17 October 1945, Federal Records Center, Suit land, MD, OMGUS
Records.
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to charges that the United States was establishing a separate 
government.^9 This episode indicates that Clay and the military 
government were acting, as they saw it, very much within the framework 
of four-power control. It was a decision based on economic necessity, 
and made with considerable hesitation.
With the creation of the Laenderrat the military government was 
able to report that by November 1945, German government was functioning 
at the village, city, county, state and zonal level. For Clay, however, 
this was not enough. Despite the occupation's successes “the German 
officials were appointees of the occupying authority and were neither 
selected by nor responsible to the German people." Clay felt that the 
military government “could neither hesitate nor delay" in getting the 
populace actively involved in political activity and, at the appropriate 
time, the electoral process.4^
For Clay the appropriate time was as soon as possible. In a 
September 3 letter to McCloy, Clay wrote that he had instructed the 
Political Division to set up a program for local elections to be held in 
early 1946. He felt that "this program is one of the most important in 
re-establishing democratic attitudes and methods. It will give the 
Germans an opportunity to learn democratic procedures on the lower 
levels before undertaking elections for larger units."41 Murphy
3^CIay, p. 86. The offices of the Laenderrat were located in 
Stuttgart, already serving as the capitol of Land Wuerttemberg-Baden.
-40Ibid., p. 87.
41Letter from Clay to McCoy, 3 September 1945, Clav Papers, p. 67.
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reported to Byrnes on September 12 that elections would be held in each 
of the American Gemeinde in January. These would be followed in March 
by the Landkreise elections, and in May by the Stadtkreise elections.4  ^
Not everyone agreed with Clay as to the desirabi1ity‘of early elections. 
James K. Pollock, Chief of the Governmental Structures Branch, suggested 
May elections at the earliest, claiming that it was "out of the question 
to complete preparations for Gemeindefn] elections before January.“4^ 
Clay later remembered telling Pollock that "to learn to swim you have to 
get in the water."44
Prior to this immersion of the German people in the ways of 
democracy, local government codes (Gemeindeordnungen) had to be drawn up 
to govern the elections. Among the problems to be tackled in the 
formulation of these codes were the questions of voter registration and 
qualification. Should former Nazis, for example, be permitted to vote? 
Also, how should the problem of residency be addressed? The immediate 
post-war period was a time of tremendous dislocation for many Germans. 
While the military government sought above all to encourage the exercise 
of the vote, it did not want to encourage people to vote in a community 
in which they were only temporarily residing, and in which they did not
4%emO from Murphy to Byrnes, 12 September 1945, FRUS. 1945. Ill, 
p. 961.
43Memo from Pollock to Director, Civil Administration Division, 2 
October 1945, Federal Records Center, Suit land, MD, OMGUS Records.
44Clay, p. 88.
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have a continuing interest.45 As long as the codes did not conflictwith 
occupation policy, however, the military authorities were content to let 
the German officials work out the specifics. This was consistent with 
the American belief in the desirability of involving the Germans in all 
phases of the democratic process.
By December, voting lists had been completed for the January 
elections, and a system for reporting and analyzing the election returns 
was prepared. It was assumed by State Department officials that a
i
system of proportional representation, similar to that used during the 
Weimar Republic, would be used for this purpose. A State memo of 
September 19 sent to Murphy by Under Secretary Dean Acheson outlined the 
Department's reasons for supporting this method of apportionment
1) No one party [would] acquire too predominant [a] 
position;
2) No party [would] assume in any way [a] role of 
opposition to occupation administration;
3) No bloc of parties [would] be formed under
46coercion. °
On the third point, Murphy was not quite convinced. A week later, he 
wrote to Byrnes that "it is pertinent to point out . . . that 
proportional representation favors growth of many parties. By 
preventing predominance of one party, it almost forces formation of 
political coalition or bloc, which is the very result we seek to
45"Political Parties, Campaigns, and Elections Within the U.S. 
Zone," 7 September 1945, Federal Records Center, Suit land, MD, OMGUS 
Records.
45Memo from Acheson to Murphy, 19 September 1945, FRUS. 1945. Ill,
p. 964.
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discourage."^7 clay, however, reported to Murphy on October 10 that 
the election codes then being drafted would most likely reflect this 
traditional German method of analyzing elections, plus any minor 
modifications which the Germans themselves might suggest.4*®
As scheduled, elections were held on January 20 and 27 in the 
smaller Gemeinden (towns under 20,000 people), of which there were over 
ten thousand in the American zone. Considering that only three months 
before officials were bemoaning the lack of political activity outside 
the cities, the voter turnout was remarkable. Of the almost five 
million eligible voters, 83% responded on election day, a figure 
substantially greater than was forecast by officials. Of the small 
number who did not vote, 7% were disqualified for Nazi affiliations.49 
Officials conceded that the "rural zone constitutes a special area which 
may not reflect majority opinion in Germany" and that "elections were 
limited to local issues and personalities." Nevertheless, they must be 
considered a success "as offering the public the chance to vote under 
fair conditions and democratic processes of which they showed 
willingness to take advantage."®^
4^Memo from Murphy to Byrnes, 25 September 1945, FRUS. 1945. Ill, 
p. 968.
4®Memo from Clay to Murphy, 10 October 1945, Federal Records 
Center, Suit land, MD, OMGUS Records.
49Memo from OMGUS to War Department, 6 February 1946, National 
Archives, Box 598.
^Memo from OMGUS to War Department, 15 February 1946, National 
Archives, Box 598.
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On April 28, 71% of the eligible voters turned out for elections in 
the Landkreise and larger Gemeinden, and 80% participated the following 
May 26 in the Stadtkreise elections. Aside from the unexpectedly high 
voter turnout, what also satisfied the American authorities was that 
many of the officials who had been appointed by the military government 
in the early stages of the occupation, had been retained in office by 
the electorate. For Clay, this was an indication "that our appointees 
had not been branded as collaborators.”^  Clay was no doubt aware that 
the Weimar government that assumed power in 1918 was wrongly accused by 
nationalists of betraying Germany, a theme used to great effect by 
Hitler to rally disaffected Germans to his cause. Accordingly, the 
apparent support of the German people in 1946 was of considerable 
importance to the American leadership, as a sign that their 
democratization program was succeeding.
The earliest directives on Germany had called for politicization at 
the Land level, as success at the local level became apparent. In 
February 1946 the minister-presidents of the three U.S. zone Laender 
were authorized tp prepare preliminary drafts of a Land constitution and 
arrange for the election of constitutional assemblies to consider these 
drafts. The delegates were elected by popular vote on June 30, 1946, 
and the assemblies convened the following month. Approved drafts were 
then sent to the military government for approval —  plus any changes 
deemed necessary —  before being submitted to the people for final 
ratification. One change that was not made concerned proportional
^*Clay, p. 88.
34
representation. Clay appears to have favored the idea in October 1945, 
yet wrote later that he did not support the plan, but that it “could not 
be considered in violation of democratic principles and [was] therefore 
accepted as representing the wishes of the electorate."52 The 
constitutions, which reflected the traditional German program of 
parliamentary government, were accepted by the Americans and Germans 
alike, and by December 1, 1946 had been ratified by the people in the 
three Lander. With 1946 coming to a close it appeared that the military 
government had returned to the Germans full responsibility for 
seIf-government.
# # *
General Clay left little doubt that the democratic processes
initiated in the U.S. zone in the fall of 1945, and brought to fruition
during 1946, were designed to facilitate four-power unity, and were not
a response to any Soviet provocation. . Clay wrote to McCloy on September
3, 1945 (the same letter in which he acknowledged that he had instructed
the Political Division to set up a program for elections) that he was
much encouraged by the general attitude of 
cooperation and the apparent desire, especially 
on the part of the Russians, to work with us in
solving various problems. 1 believe that we
are making real headway in breaking down their 
feelings of suspicion and mistrust.53
52Ibid., p. 89.
53Letter from Clay to McCloy, 3 September 1945, Clav Papers, p. 63.
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That the concepts of holding democratic elections and improved Soviet
relations each found their way into the same letter is an indication
that Clay did not view U.S. plans to proceed with elections as
particularly controversial, or contrary to maintaining good relations
with their A11ies.
Clay did, however, have certain goals in mind when the military
government undertook the political reconstruction of the American zone.
Clay later wrote that he hoped that
parallel action would be taken in other zones 
so that the Allied Control Council would have 
no difficulty in setting up for all Germany the 
central administrations required by the Potsdam 
agreement and so that these administrations 
would find the structures of state government 
available to facilitate their work.5**
On September 12, Murphy wrote to Byrnes that "this measure [elections]
has not yet been discussed with representatives of the other occupying
powers but will be brought up informally in the political
directorate."5® A month later, a memo from Clay's office stated that
The U.S. schedules will be presented on a quad­
ripartite basis and an endeavor will be made to 
secure correlated action which will result in 
similar elections under similar electoral methods 
throughout all zones simultaneously.®
The memo added that it was impossible "to forecast what results will be
obtained so that it is imperative that we proceed with the schedules as
54Clay, p. 91.
®®Memo from Murphy to Byrnes, 12 September 1945, FRUS. 1945. Ill, 
p. 962.
55Memo from Clay to Murphy, 10 October 1945.
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currently laid down."57 Officials were not going to allow the issue of 
elections to become mired in Control Council deliberations. Neither 
were they going to hold elections uni laterally without consulting the 
other occupying powers.
In March 1946, another attempt was made at political unification. 
The U.S. suggested that political parties be allowed to function on a 
national basis. This proposal, like the one above, met with failure, 
and the politicization of the U.S. zone continued on a course distinct 
from the other zones. By the spring of 1946, quadripartite cooperation, 
was beginning to show the strain that deadlock on a variety of issues 
had caused. Accordingly, events at the Allied level would have 




3. Roadblock to Democracy
The revival of German political life had occurred at a fairly rapid 
pace, spurred on by the desire of the American occupation authorities to 
return to the Germans virtually all responsibility for government. 
However, this political revival had presumed the simultaneous 
accomp1ishment at the four-power level of the economic, and eventual 
political, unification of Germany. The failure of the Allies to develop 
the machinery for unification left the American zone in political limbo. 
The re-establishment of German government in the U.S. zone had been 
predicated on the notion that it would serve as a basis for future 
national government. This step, however, seemed at best a long way off, 
effectively meaning that German government in the U.S. zone had for the 
time being gone as far as it would go. Yet, it appears also that 
American officials, concerned primarily with German economic unity, were 
content to put further democratic growth on hold. Doing so, however, 
proved more difficult, as the momentum of German democracy would not be 
easily slowed. The awkwardness of this situation most likely was not 
seen until 1946, but the roots of the problem can be detected in the 
early occupation period.
It has been mentioned that the creation of the Laenderrat in 
October 1945 was a step born out of necessity by the failure of the four 
occupying powers to agree to the implementation of the Potsdam 
agreement, calling for the creation of central agencies. Furthermore, 
this step was seen as being a purely economic one, evidenced by Clay's 
decision not to create a capitoI for the Laenderrat, for fear of it
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being possibly misunderstood as a political move. With American policy 
consistently calling for the decentralization of the political 
structure, the creation of a central agency with a political function 
would hardly seem appropriate.
This suggests that American authorities were confident they could 
keep separate the economic and political development of the U.S. zone. 
Yet, with the creation of the Laenderrat, and the initiation of 
democratic processes, two components of the occupation moved onto a 
collision course. The resulting clash received its impetus from the 
continued French refusal to agree to the Potsdam proposals. Eventual 
deterioration of Soviet-American relations would color the way 
contemporaries, notably Clay himself, viewed the Soviet role in the 
occupation of Germany,* but in early 1946 the main obstacle to 
four-power unity was perceived to be France. In April, a frustrated 
Clay recommended to Byrnes that the French be informed that unless they 
concurred immediately to the establishment of central agencies, "all 
shipments of wheat to the French zone of Germany will be discontinued," 
and "shipments Cof] wheat to France will also be discontinued if French 
still unwilling to a g r e e . T h e  State Department, however, refused to 
exert more than nominal pressure on the French, fearing that doing so 
might topple the fragile coalition government in France, and usher into 
power elements, such as Communists, hostile to American interests.^
*Clay, pp. x-xi.
^Memo from Clay to Byrnes, 11 April 1946, Clav Papers, p. 190.
^Memo from Caffery to Byrnes, 1 March 1946, FRUS. 1946. V, p. 511.
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This episode is an excellent example of the divergence in State 
Department and OMGUS opinion regarding the obstacles to agreement in 
Germany. The State Department, with such men as George Kennan setting 
the tone, had a considerably greater mistrust of the Soviet Union than 
its OMGUS counterparts in Berlin.4 While State was concerned that 
pressure on the French might facilitate the Communists assuming power, 
OMGUS was concerned that the absence of pressure would damage whatever 
chance existed for four-power agreement and, therefore, unification.
The difference, Jean Edward Smith suggests, was that "those closest to 
the Russian presence in Germany did not despair of Soviet cooperation."^ 
More than that, it indicates that the State Department was beginning to 
look beyond Germany, focusing rather on the larger implications of their 
German policy. OMGUS policy was neither intentionally anti-Soviet nor 
anti-French, but pro-unification, and it concerned officials that the 
State Department posture was growing more anti-Soviet, while relations 
in Germany remained relatively cordial..
This should not imply, however, that tension did not exist between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviets had suffered 
tremendous human and material loss during the course of the war, and 
consequently Soviet officials expected, if not demanded, some help in
4In February 1946 Kennan would issue his 7 long telegram'' from 
Moscow on the sources of Soviet conduct, a forerunner to his July 1947 
'X' article, the intellectual argument for containment. In 1946, the 
appeal of the telegram within the State Department would elevate Kennan 
to a prominent position as head of the Policy Planning Staff.
5Jean Edward Smith, "General Clay and the Russians: A Continuation
of the Wartime Alliance in Germany, 1945-1948." Virginia Quarterly
Review 64 (1988): 22.
40
the reconstruction of their war-torn country. It was further expected
/
that this help would come through reparations, which the Russians would 
exact in two ways. First, the Soviets would physically remove from
Germany capital equipment from its remaining heavy industry to
compensate for Russian industry destroyed by the war. Secondly, the 
Soviets expected to benefit from the resumption of German industry, by 
appropriating part of their current production for Soviet use. 
Problematic in this was that since the major industrial areas did not 
all lie in the Soviet zone of occupation, reparations would in part 
involve the dismantling and removal of industry from the western zones.^
Recognizing Russia's post-war reconstruction needs, the United 
States agreed in principle to support a reparations plan, though 
American policy prevented the authorities from ever fully satisfying 
Soviet expectations on the issue. American skepticism had its roots in
the aftermath of World War I. The Versailles participants had imposed
upon defeated Germany a reparations figure completely out of proportion 
with their ability to pay. Heartened by the Weimar government's attempt 
at democracy and the apparent desire of Germany to assume the role of a 
responsible world power, the United States sought to lessen the burden 
of the reparations through loans, under the auspices of the Dawes Plan 
C1924) and the Young Plan (1929). These loans had the combined effect 
of indirectly subsidizing those countries receiving German reparations,
^Under the original reparations plan, the Soviet Union was entitled 
to 25% of the capital equipment in the western zones slated for 
dismantling and removal.
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as well as providing Germany with the financial means to rebuild 
mi 1itarily.
Oddly enough, in the post World War II period, American reluctance 
to participate in a reparations scheme survived a complete shift in 
policy. When the influence of Henry Morgenthau was at its peak, the 
United States was determined to de-industrialize German industry to the 
point that she would never again be able to wage war. However, 
providing reparations to the Russians, on the scale they sought, 
possibly would entail the revival of German industry to a level not 
contemplated under pastoralization schemes. Even the State Department, 
far from subscribing to Morgenthau's severe de-industrialization plan, 
was concerned in January 1945 that "reparations should not become a 
pretext for increasing Germany's Capacity to pay/ by rebuilding its 
productive power."7 Morgenthau's influence died with Roosevelt, leaving 
the door open for the State Department's multilateral view to 
predominate in policy-making. In a complete departure from Morgenthau, 
State saw limited German industrial revival as crucial to the 
revitalization of Europe, a necessary component in State's economic 
world view. Bruce Kuklick has written that State believed "Germany 
would not easily take her place in a multilateral order if she were to 
pay substantial recurring reparations."® Reparations, once seen as an
7,1 Department of State Recommendations for the Economic Treatment of 
Germany," SC-16, 2 January 1945, National Archives, Record Group 353.
®Bruce Kuklick, American Po1i cv and the Pi vision of Germany 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 124.
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undesirable growth stimulus, became an equally undesirable growth 
inhibi tor.
American officials felt that the implementation of the central
agency provision of the Potsdam agreement would be the best
quadripartite expression of multilateral intentions. To help break the 
impasse in the Control Council, Clay in May 1946 ordered a halt on all 
dismantling and reparation removals fron the U.S. zone, effective until 
agreement on economic unification was reached.9 Kuklick has argued that 
it was a distinctly anti-Russian move, designed to pressure the Soviet 
Union into integrating Germany into a multilateral order.10 The State 
Department, however, maintained that the reparations halt was a 
temporary measure designed to shake up the Control Council (France and 
Great Britian were also receiving German reparations, though in smaller
amounts), and stimulate action on the question of economic unity.11 In
this respect, the reparations issue was merely a lever used to achieve 
the greater goal, for which the main obstacle was not the Soviet Union 
(the Soviets would maintain their support for central agencies until 
August 1946), but the French. In July, Clay reiterated his conviction 
that "French unwillingness to enter into agreements relative to 
governing Germany as a whole makes it difficult to place blame on the
9Letter from Clay to Echols, 2 May 1946, Clav Papers. p. 204; Press 
Conference (Clay), 27 May 1946, Clav Papers, p. 218.
10Kuklick, p. 137.
^U.S., Department of State, Occupation of Germany: Pol icy and 
Progress. 1945-46. 1947, p. 34.
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Soviet."Skeptics of the Soviet Union, however, wouid receive some 
vindication by the events of mid-1946.
* * #
Throughout 1946 the French continued to press their claims for the 
Saar region as a precondition to their consideration of a plan for 
central economic agencies. And while OMGUS officials still considered 
the French to be the primary obstacle to economic unity, some in the 
State Department were beginning to question Soviet motivations. In 
March, Kennan wrote to Byrnes that "I would by no means accept it as a 
foregone conclusion that Russians have really been eager, up to this 
time, to see central German administrative agencies established."^ 
French intransigence on this issue, Murphy wrote in February, has 
"played directly into the hands of the Soviet Union which has taken full 
advantage of French obstructionism to consolidate the Soviet position in 
eastern Germany." Murphy observed further that "the United States and 
United Kingdom must sympathize with the French view because if they 
[U.S., U.K.] didn't they possess ample means to persuade France to agree 
to Potsdam." It would be difficult, Murphy continued, for the Russians 
or the Germans "to believe that France is acting independently without
^Memo from Clay to McNarney, 23 July 1946, Clav Papers, p. 244.
l^Memo from Kennan to Byrnes, 6 March 1946, FRUS. 1946. V, p.
517.
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the tacit or active approval of the U.K and/or U.S."14 The State 
Department's failure to persuade France to yield allowed them, in 
Gimbel's words, "to exercise influence in Germany far greater than the 
postwar national power they possessed would have otherwise seemed to 
permi t."16
The Soviet Union had consistently advocated German unity, which 
gained them a considerable amount of support among the German people. 
Like the United States, the Soviets simultaneously consolidated their 
own position in Germany, all this while France maintained her opposition 
to central agencies. If people felt that the obstacle to unity was the 
French, but with American consent, then the burden of the failure of the 
Potsdam agreement could fall squarely on the shoulders of the United 
States. Dean Acheson was one determined to avoid this eventuality. On 
May 9 the Under Secretary of State wrote Byrnes that assuming "U.S. 
insistence on treatment of Germany as economic unit has been motivated 
primarily by U.S. interest in preventing permanent division of Germany," 
then a plan should be designed “to force Soviet Union to show its real 
attitude toward unification of Germany . . . and to avoid any danger 
that Soviets might put onus of breaking with Potsdam on United 
States."16
14Memo from Murphy to Byrnes, 24 February 1946, FRUS. 1946. V, p.
506.
15John Gimbei, "On the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement: An 
Essay on U.S. Postwar German Policy." Political Science Quarterly 87 
(June 1972): 247.
16Memo from Acheson to Byrnes, 9 May 1946, FRUS. 1946. V, pp. 550-1.
45
Clay's own concern over the deteriorating economic situation in 
Germany prompted him to suggest that Germany be centralized into as 
large an area as possible. At the Council of Foreign Minister's meeting 
in Paris in July 1946, Byrnes offered the other three zones the 
opportunity to join with the United States in treating Germany as an 
economic unit, thereby fulfilling the Potsdam agreement. On July 30, 
the British accepted the invitation, the only other power that would do 
so. Byrnes' thinking was made clear in a landmark speech in Stuttgart 
on September 6, 1946. He reiterated the United States' commitment to 
economic unification, and added that the "time has come when the zonal 
boundaries should be regarded as defining only the areas to be occupied 
for security purposes . . . and not as self-contained economic or 
political units.n1  ^ Any doubts concerning American commitment to 
economic unification were removed when the U.S. and Great Britain signed 
an agreement in New York in December creating Bizonia, to go into effect 
January 1, 1947. Doubts, however, did exist as to what this new 
agreement would mean to the political development of the U.S. zone. The 
almost unhindered growth of democracy in the American zone had come up 
against a formidable roadblock, the effect of which was to have 
important consequences for the future of Germany.
* # #
^U.S., Department of State, "Address by Secretary of State," 
Bui let in. 15 September 1946, pp. 497-8.
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Concerning the bizonal merger, Clay would later write that the 
"joint administration of the two zones was started not in the interest 
of political reconstruction but as a practical step toward better 
economic conditions within the area, thus reducing the burden of support 
borne by the occupying powers."*® At the time, Clay wrote that "I do 
have to preserve the political structure in our zone and protect the 
delegated policy which we have given German officials. This may offer 
some problem . . . but I am sure that it is one we shall be able to 
handle."*^ This casual attitude suggests that OMGUS had not prepared 
for the political consequences of Bizonia, a lack of understanding which 
put it in danger of undermining all that they had achieved of a 
political nature since mid-1945. The problem was that the American 
authorities had not completely abandoned hope for some understanding 
with the other two occupying powers, and they were consequently 
reluctant to give Bizonia a political structure which might signal a 
permanent division of the country.
Throughout 1946 the political development of the American zone 
proceeded on a schedule already discussed. On the heels of the decision 
in July to merge with the British zone in 1947, interzonal communication 
and cooperation began, taking the form, for example, of conferences of 
the minister-presidents of both zones. Such exchanges had the effect, 
according to Gimbel, of facilitating "the development of German
18C1ay, p. 163.
*9Letter from Clay to Brian Robertson, Deputy Military Governor, 
U.K., 31 July 1946, Clav Papers, p. 245.
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political forces and coalitions with interests of their own . . . ."20 
Yet, in keeping with its desire to avoid the appearance of political 
union, the military government opposed the creation of a 
popularly-elected bizonal legislature. It did establish bizonal 
economic agencies to address certain interzonal problems. These 
agencies were created unilaterally under the authority of the military 
government, rather than the people. This was taking place as the OMGUS 
democratization program was going forward "amidst much propaganda about 
the tremendous progress American-zone Germans were making toward 
self-government and local responsibility."2*
OMGUS had found itself in the unenviable position of having to 
choose between its zonal democratization program and its bizonal 
economic interests. In short, economic necessity prevailed. The 
military government had established the institutions of self-government, 
then stripped them of authority in favor of its own bizonal economic 
program. Clay later described the inevitable effect on the state 
governments, which "felt that they represented more nearly the will of 
the German people and therefore accepted the rulings of the bizonal 
agencies reluctantly and sometimes only after they were required to do 
so by military government."22 Finally, in May 1947, with the 
possibility of four-power unity diminishing rapidly, the United States 
and Great Britain established a strengthened bizonal administration




designed to place greater responsibility in the hands of the Germans. 
Bizonia, which had been intended as an economic expedient, had been 
recognized as a political entity, a step of great significance as 
Germany began the seemingly inevitable march toward division.
* # *
The United States had pursued in Germany a policy that it felt 
would facilitate the unification of the occupied country. Yet, as the 
democratization program enjoyed one success after another, Germany was 
gradually moving away from, rather than toward, unification. Kuklick 
has suggested that American policy may not have been intentionally 
divisive, but that in fact it was so.^ The distinction, however, is 
important. Much emphasis has been placed here on the intent of those 
American officials in Germany charged with the responsibility of making 
and implementing policy. What this has shown is that American actions 
in the early occupation period were motivated by a spirit of cooperation 
and a desire for unification. This spirit, however, could not survive 
in the increasingly tense climate outside of Germany.
The State Department took a dim view of the prospects for 
cooperation, especially with the Soviet Union, an outlook likely 
inspired by their multilateral world view. . These officials saw in the 
Soviet Union a formidable obstacle to their conception of a worldwide 
free-market economy. If cooperation with the Soviets could produce such 
an economy, so much the better. But cooperation should not be confused
^Kuklick, p. 65.
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with compromise. The State Department was more than willing to 
cooperate with the other three powers on unification, but on American 
terms. Men such as longtime Secretary of State Cordell Hull subscribed 
to what Arthur Schlesinger has called the universal’ist approach to 
diplomacy which, simply put, meant that "all nations shared a common 
interest in ail the affairs of the w o r l d . T h e s e  men had no desire to 
divide the world into spheres of influence, thereby relinquishing the 
opportunity to exert political and economic influence on a global basis. 
Yet, the harder they pressed their universalist claim, the more real 
became the possibility of an economically divided world.
This universalist vs. sphere-of-influence debate, however, was 
waged in Washington, not in Germany. The point is that the military 
government and the State Department differed in opinion because they 
differed in perspective. The February 1947 Truman Doctrine, which many 
consider to be the United States' unofficial declaration of the Cold 
War, preceded by more than a year the breakdown of the Control Council 
in March 1948, which effectively ended any hopes for German unification. 
The considerable lapse of time between these two events can be 
attributed to the fact that Cold War tension originated in Washington 
and Moscow, and only slowly filtered down to the negotiating parties in 
Germany. Of course, it is doubtful that much chance for unification 
existed once the governments of each country had engaged in hostile 
declarations toward the other. But it does give some indication that
^Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War." Foreign 
Affairs 46 (October 1967): 26.
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those in Germany did not early on abandon hope, or the negotiating 
table, because of conflict at the international level.
Accordingly, Gimbel has written that it is "generally inaccurate, 
misleading, and unhistorical to speak of the contrast between an Eastern 
and Western (or a Soviet and an Allied, or a Russian and a 'free world') 
position on the issues of Germany."^ The Cold War did not originate in 
Germany, though the tremendous tension engendered by the superpower 
conflict would later surface there. When it did surface, it did so in 
dramatic fashion. In April 1948, on the heels of the Control Council 
collapse, the Soviet Union cut off all land access to Berlin, forcing 
the United States to supply the German people through an airlift. The 
lifting of the blockade in May 1949 prompted the formation of the West 
German government. This government no doubt reflected the failure of 
the superpowers to reach agreement for the unification of Germany, as 
well as the American desire to reintegrate the country into the European 
economy. But, ironically, the formation of this government re 1ied quite 
v heavily on a political structure introduced at a time in Germany when 
optimism set the tone, and unification was the plan.
^Gimbel, "On the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement," p. 247.
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Conclusion
The political reconstruction of western Germany after World War II 
went through three distinct stages: the establishment of zonal and Land 
political structures, the fusion of the American and British zones —  
first economical 1y, then politically —  in 1947, and the creation of the 
West German government in 1949. The first stage, most actively pursued 
in the U.S. zone, was accomplished not to facilitate division, but to 
provide a framework within which quadripartite control could operate 
when agreement was reached on economic unification. Political 
reconstruction, however, quickly outran economic agreement in the 
Control Council. When the economic realities of Germany's condition 
made delay intolerable, unification with as many zones as possible 
became mandatory. The irony of the merger is that the American 
authorities, who had labored in 1945 to encourage political activity, 
sought to discourage the Germans from seeking a political role for 
Bizonia. That the Americans were willing to undermine the very 
political revival they had sparked was evidence of first, the economic 
primacy of their mission and second, their intense desire to avoid the 
appearance of having created a separate German political entity,
Most importantly, though, the willingness to undermine the 
democratic growth of Germany showed a genuine lack of understanding for 
the nature of democracy. The occupation's political program had sought 
to instill in the German people a respect for the democratic process, 
and a desire to govern the country in a democratic fashion. After all, 
it was anticipated that the United States would not always be in
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Germany, and if a genuinely democratic Germany were to eventually 
emerge, it would do so under the auspices of the German people, not the 
United States.
When the 1946 elections brought such a tremendous response, the 
American authorities undoubtedly felt that democracy was making inroads 
into the thinking of the people. Likewise, the desire in 1947 to 
establish a popularly-elected political structure for Bizonia seemed a 
natural progression for a nation and its leadership looking to 
re-establish itself on a democratic basis. Halting this political 
momentum, as American officials then sought to do, suggests that the 
occupation engaged in what John D. Montgomery called an "artificial 
revolution."* They sought radical change in the German political 
structure, and in the attitudes of the people, but they wanted to 
regulate that change and dictate how far it would go. Obviously, this 
most un-democratic behavior set a poor precedent for the German people. 
The United States would eventually yield to the inevitable political 
implications of Bizonia, but that they did so hesitantly is an 
unfortunate blot on their record.
That they did so unwillingly, however, also attests to their desire 
to prevent Germany's division. Furthermore, this desire implied a 
willingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union, which would be necessary 
if unification was to be achieved. Before his death, Roosevelt had 
expressed the opinion that Germany would be the proving ground for
*John D. Montgomery, Forced to be Free: The Artificial Revolution 
in Germany and Japan. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
53
Soviet-American cooperation. This cooperative spirit would permeate 
OMGUS policy after his death, but it quickly fell out of favor with the 
more anti-Soviet State Department, most likely because of the threat the 
Soviet Union posed to State's vision of a multilateral world economy. 
Consequently, attempts at cooperation in Germany were often frustrated 
at the administration level, where Soviet-American tension set the tone. 
This tension would eventually divide Germany, helped in no small way by 
the political progress of the American zone and then Bizonia.
Ironically, a program that had been undertaken with unification in mind, 
would eventually assist in the defeat of this objective.
The conception of Germany as the primary proving ground for 
Soviet-American cooperation never materialized. If it had, the 
complexion of the post-war world might be significantly different than 
it is today. But for each side, the Soviet Union and the United States, 
the differences were too fundamental and the stakes too high, to simply 
allow the affairs in Germany dictate the disposition of the post-war 
world. No doubt Roosevelt would have appreciated the relative 
cordiality that remained in Germany after relations between Wahington 
and Moscow had soured, but by 1947 it mattered little. The nation whose 
defeat had galvanized the Allied nations during World War II, had been 
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